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- <text id=91TT2020>
- <title>
- Sep. 16, 1991: A New Army for a New State
- </title>
- <history>
- TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1991
- Sep. 16, 1991 Can This Man Save Our Schools?
- </history>
- <article>
- <source>Time Magazine</source>
- <hdr>
- WORLD, Page 36
- SOVIET UNION
- A New Army for a New State
- </hdr><body>
- <p>After the coup attempt, Soviet military forces have a mission to
- help build democracy and stability
- </p>
- <p>By Condoleezza Rice
- </p>
- <p>[Condoleezza Rice, a professor of political science at Stanford,
- was, until March, special assistant to President George Bush for
- Soviet affairs.]
- </p>
- <p> For the past three years, I've met regularly with senior
- officers of the Soviet armed forces. Some of them have now been
- purged for sins of either commission or omission during last
- month's coup attempt. But the actions--or, more to the point,
- the inaction--of several commanders from Aug. 19 to 21
- confirmed what I'd often been told: Soviet military officers are
- no men on horseback, forever overthrowing political authorities.
- To be sure, pluralism in the Soviet Union brought out the worst
- in the army. Senior officers grumbled publicly about reform, and
- some called for the use of an iron fist. Yet when the crunch
- came, the army and many of its leaders, including the new
- Minister of Defense, General Yevgeni Shaposhnikov, stayed on the
- sidelines. Thus the Soviet army still has a chance to find a
- place in a stable and democratic successor to the communist
- Soviet Union. If that is to happen, personnel changes are not
- enough. A stable democracy needs sturdy institutions, not just
- charismatic personalities.
- </p>
- <p> The principal instrument of civilian control over the
- Soviet armed forces has always been the Communist Party.
- Officers were party members; political commissars were placed
- in every unit to ensure loyalty. With the collapse of the party,
- Soviet reformers must move quickly to put new mechanisms in
- place, including a civilian Defense Minister and means of
- legislative oversight, particularly of military spending.
- </p>
- <p> As President of the union, Gorbachev is still commander in
- chief of nearly 4 million troops and an arsenal of almost 30,000
- nuclear weapons. Yet the central command faces an uncertain
- future. Last week's interim agreement between the Kremlin and
- 10 republics raised more questions than it answered about what
- kind of state will emerge. Even if they accept Moscow as the
- capital of a loose confederation, the republics are sure to
- demand a high degree of control over forces on their territory.
- </p>
- <p> Yet a cluster of totally independent armies would spell
- trouble for everyone. The Russian republic's overwhelming
- military might would intimidate others in the confederation.
- Ethnic conflicts, especially in the south, would be more likely
- to escalate to all-out war. And a Russian-dominated central army
- might invite a replay of the disaster that has befallen
- Yugoslavia, where the supposedly federal army is in reality a
- Serbian army.
- </p>
- <p> The best solution may be a two-tier system: the republics
- would raise territorial defense units that would be subject to
- Moscow's authority only in a crisis and only with the consent
- of the republics' parliaments, while the confederation would
- form an army of its own composed of decently paid volunteers
- from all over. Only that body would have weapons of mass
- destruction. That way, when the process of transformation now
- under way is complete, we can be assured that there will still
- be only one nuclear power on the land mass that is today the
- U.S.S.R.
- </p>
-
- </body></article>
- </text>
-
-